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KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
more properly declare that acquiescence raises the presumption that
the boundary is correct, but only after the full statutory period has
passed does the presumption become conclusive.
Kentucky takes a peculiar and apparently indefensible position in
regard to the question under consideration. The courts declare: "The
parties do not undertake to acquire or transfer land, but merely to
make certain that which they regard1 as uncertain." Turner v. Bowens,
203 S. W. 749, 180 Ky.'755 (1918); Keen v. Osborne, 215 S. W. 798, 185
Ky. 647 (1919). in short, the courts say that the parties merely give
a definite construction to the language of the deed, and take under
the written deed. However, if the taking is under such deed (an impossibility in those cases in which the language is not ambiguous and
the true construction is thus ascertainable), the parol agreement is
alone sufficient. The courts nevertheless uniformly declare that for
such parol agreement to be valid, there must be a bona fide dispute
and possession taken under such dispute.
It is to be admitted that other states make the same error in this
regard. However, the solution, as given supra, that a bona fide dispute
plus the possession eliminates the question of the Statute of Frauds
and appears the practical and the underlying, though unexpressed,
basis of the decisions. In Kentucky there should be no such solution
as Kentucky courts do not recognize part performance as taking parol
agreements out of the Statute of Frauds in other situations.
The reason for the failure to take note of the lack of logic of her
position is not apparent in the decisions. Perhaps, the expldnation
is the practicability of the holding and thus the practicability of overlooking logical defects. Mississippi courts, likewise barring part performance as taking parol agreements out of the Statute of Frauds, explain their decisions as follows: "An early decision was posslbly due
to an erroneous impression that their allowance is really a judicially
created exception to the Statute of Frauds; neverthless the decision is
still binding on this court." Archer v. HeZm, 69 Miss. 730, 11 So. 3.
RAWLINGS RAGLAND.
TORTS-DUTY OP STOREKEEPER TO PROVIDE A SAFE PLACE FOR
CusToMERS.--Plaintiff, on entering defendant's store, slipped and fell,
injuring herself. The floor of the store had been oiled. In an action
for damages for personal injury she was allowed to recover. On appeal
the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The
court in discussing the duty of the storekeeper said, "Appellant had
a right to oil the floor of its store. It was not an insurer of appellee's
safety while using its floor. But, it was its duty, after oiling it, to use
ordinary care, that is, that degree of care usually exercised by an
ordinarily prudent person engaged in the same line of business, to
maintain its floor in a reasonably sate condition for the use of its
customers while using it when making their purchases of its goods."
Eroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. Monrle, 34 S. W. (2nd) 929 (1931).
This seems to be the rule, both in Kentucky and generally as to
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the duty of a storekeeper to provide a safe place for his customers. In
Leonard v. Enterprise Realty Co., 187 Ky. 578, 219 S. W. 1066, 10 A. L.
R. 238 (1920), the court said, "The owner who expressly or by implication invites or induces others to come upon his premises, whether
for business or other purposes, owes to them the duty of being reasonably sure he is not inviting them into danger, and must exercise
ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably safe."
Likewise In Majestic Theatre Co. v. Lutz, 210 Ky. 92, 275 S. W. 16
(1S25), the court held that one who invites others to come upon his
premises "must exercise ordinary care and prudence to render the
premises reasonably safe."
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Graham, 257 S. W. 574, Tex. Civ. App.
(1924), resembles the principal case in that the action was for injury
sustained by one who fell upon the floor where a bottle had been
broken and the floor rendered slippery. The court set forth the storekeeper's duty as follows, "The defendant by law was chargeable with
the duty to use ordinary care to keep its floors and entrance to its
place of business reasonably safe for the use of those who might lawfully have occasion to use them."
"Ordinary care under the circumstances" is the test by which we
shall judge the duty of a storekeeper to his customers to provide a
safe place for them. Ford v. John Wanamaker, 150 N. Y. S. 795, 165
App. Div. 2S4 (1914); Graham v. Joseph H. Bouland Co., 97 App. Div.
141, 89 N. Y. S. 595 (1904); Dwyer v. Hill's Bros. Co., 79 N. Y. S. 785
(1903); Hill Grocery Co. v. Hameker, 89 So. 850, 18 Ala. App. S4
(1921). Ordinary care is that care which ordinarily prudent persons
would exercise under the same, like, or similar circumstances, and
the want of such care is negligence. L. & N. R. Co. v. Semonis, 51 S. W.
612; L. & X. R. Co. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403.
When a storekeeper is liable under the above rule, he has not used
that care and foresight which an ordinarily prudent person under the
circumstances would have used. The principal difficulty is in determining just what care such an ordinarily prudent person would have
used. Who is an ordinarily prudent person? Does each man upon the
jury represent this mythical person? Does any man on the jury represent him? Will the care that would be exercised by this person be
the same according to one jury as it will according to another? These
and similar question have long beset those who have dealt with the
law of torts. There is, of course no definite action that an ordinarily
prudent person would take under each set of circumstances, and no
hard' and fast rule can be drawn. However, no better means of determining liability has ever been suggested, and justice, it would seem,
Is served quite well under the present rule. Although there may never
be one who serves upon a jury who is ordinarily prudent, it Is believed
that in the majority of cases the aggregate judgment of any twelve
men will be, as far as it is possible to determine, the judgment of an
ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances.
JAMES C. LYNE.

